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Abstract: one of the more obscure arguments for Rawls’ difference principle dubbed 
‘the Pareto argument for inequality’ has been criticised by G. A. Cohen (1995, 2008) 
as being inconsistent. In this paper, we examine and clarify the Pareto argument in de-
tail and argue (1) that justification for the Pareto principles derives from rational self-
interest and thus the Pareto principles ought to be understood as conditions of indi-
vidual rationality, (2) that the Pareto argument is not inconsistent, contra Cohen, and 
(3) that the kind of bargaining model required to arrive at the particular unequal dis-
tribution that the difference principle picks out is a model that is not based on bargain-
ing according to one’s threat advantage.  
 
The Pareto argument for Inequality is one of the more obscure arguments for Rawls’ 
difference principle found in A Theory of Justice. Put briefly, the argument justifies a 
particular deviation from an initial equal distribution of primary social goods that is 
ultimately unequal so long as everyone is made better off from this deviation. The ar-
gument itself is arguably the ‘more fundamental’ and ‘more direct’ argument for the 
difference principle.2 In addition, we say, it is one of the ‘strongest’ arguments for the 
difference principle since by not appealing to the original position it is immune to any 
objections that are derived from decision-making procedures under conditions of 
(complete) uncertainty.3  
The most important component of the argument and what ensures its distinctness 
is the introduction of the notion of bargaining and of determining an outcome or dis-
tribution that is based on the relevant parties reaching an agreement. The basic con-
cept underlying the argument is not understood in terms of ‘what mutually interested 
people choosing principles to advance their own interests from behind a veil of igno-
rance would agree in choosing,’ (Barry 1989, 214) but rather in terms of what distri-
bution of primary social goods rational agents would unanimously agree upon in the 
context of bargaining in a cooperative manner. The argument arrives at the difference 
principle by appealing to the Pareto principles which are subject to independent justifi-
                                                 
1 Thanks to _______[BLINDED]___ 
2 Barry, for example, says that the Pareto argument is ‘Rawls’ fundamental argument for the difference 
principle’ (1989, 213) and that it is ‘the direct argument in chapter 2 of A Theory of Justice’ (1989, 
215). 
3 The most famous objection we have in mind here is John Harsanyi’s derivation of utilitarianism from 
decision-making under conditions of complete uncertainty vis-à-vis the original position. See (Harsanyi 
1982) for discussion. 
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cation and which are implemented in a particular bargaining model fit for the circum-
stances of justice. Thus, the notions employed in the argument are independent from 
the more well-known argument that appeals to the original position.4  
Despite its uniqueness and prima facie strengths, the argument has been under-
discussed and has received little attention in the literature.5 However, the argument has 
not gone unscathed. Two main criticisms of the Pareto argument are as follows. First, 
G. A. Cohen criticises the Pareto argument as being inconsistent in virtue of having 
one part that espouses equality as the initial prima facie just distribution of primary 
social goods (first stage of the argument) and another part that justifies a particular 
departure from this equality that is ultimately unequal (second stage). Cohen con-
cludes that the egalitarian reservations that underpin the first stage cannot be upheld 
when the argument eventually tells us that an unequal outcome is nonetheless justified. 
Second, Patrick Shaw argues that ‘[t]he Pareto argument for inequality depends on 
taking it as self-evident that Pareto changes are changes for the better’ (1999, 368). 
However, according to Shaw, it is not at all clear that Pareto changes are changes for 
the better and that the Pareto principles are self-evident. Thus, the grounds on which 
the Pareto argument depends are undermined and so the Pareto argument fails to get 
off the ground.  
In this paper we revisit the Pareto argument, and examine and clarify it in detail 
(§1). In clarifying the argument we stress a subtlety that is overlooked in the little criti-
cism it has received, namely, that the argument only justifies a particular unequal dis-
tribution which is the most equal of the Pareto-optimal outcomes. We argue that the 
justification for the Pareto principles derives from the principles of individual rational-
ity and are not based on self-evidence, so, contra Shaw, the argument can get off the 
ground (§2). We further argue that the Pareto argument is not inconsistent because it 
is after all irrational to prefer the initial equal distribution in light of the most equal 
Pareto-optimal outcome, contra Cohen (§3). Finally we further develop the Pareto ar-
gument by explicating the kind of bargaining model required to arrive at the particular 
unequal distribution that the difference principle picks out. The model in question im-
plements a principle, we call, ‘full cooperation’ and is not based on bargaining accord-
ing to one’s threat advantage but rather rational cooperation (§4). 
 
§1: The Pareto Argument for Inequality  
                                                 
4 David Lyons also detects this independent line of argument in Rawls, and thinks,  
The reason [why] is that one can construe Rawls’ principles as a rational (self-interested) depar-
ture from an egalitarian norm, … This interpretation is encouraged by the fact that one can find 
in Rawls the suggestion of an argument for egalitarianism plus another argument, on rational 
(self-interested) grounds, to depart from that norm (1989, 152). 
5 The literature on the Pareto argument is contained within the following handful of articles/chapters: 
(Barry 1989, ch. 6; Cohen 1995; 2008, ch. 4; Shaw 1999). 
3 
 
The Pareto argument states that a certain distributional inequality of primary social 
goods is required by justice. This particular state of affairs is the just state of affairs. In 
Cohen’s discussion of Rawls and Barry, he presents the Pareto argument as consisting 
in two stages. The first stage says that equality of opportunity or income is the initial 
prima facie just outcome, and the second stage says that a certain departure from the 
initial equality is justified so long as everyone benefits from the shift from the initial 
equality to this particular inequality. 
The logical structure of this is not entirely clear, but we understand Barry and 
Cohen as saying the Pareto argument has two separate arguments as parts which when 
conjoined result in the conclusion that a certain unequal state of affairs is justified and 
that it is rational for agents in the initial state of affairs to prefer this unequal outcome 
over their current situation and will subsequently all agree on this Pareto-optimal out-
come when rationally interacting in the bargaining problem of justice.  
The first stage of the Pareto argument, according to Rawls and Barry, is grounded 
in our intuitive notion of justice. We think that being free and equal persons and being 
at the outset of a society requires that there be an equal distribution of social primary 
goods.6 This is so because the differences in talent, interests, and genetic endowments 
are ‘morally arbitrary’ and thus should not be given weight in the initial distribution of 
goods.7 However, given that our initial distribution is equal, there are certain other 
distributions that, while unequal, are to the benefit of everyone. One of these unequal 
but Pareto-optimal outcomes is to be preferred over the initial distribution if everyone 
is better off in this unequal Pareto-optimal state of affairs.   
The second stage of the Pareto argument is grounded in rationality or rational self-
interest. If all parties gain from shifting from one state of affairs to another, then each 
party must prefer this shift on pain of violating the most basic principle of rationality. 
It is irrational to prefer the initial equal distribution in light of this Pareto-superior 
state of affairs. Thus, it is rational to prefer this unequal Pareto-superior state of af-
fairs.  
Note well that the conclusion is not that so long as everyone gains we ought to pre-
fer any Pareto-superior distribution to the initial equality. For this would have the un-
toward consequence of embracing Pareto-superior distributions that contain tremen-
dous gaps of inequality as just. For instance, the Pareto argument does not licence a 
shift from the initial equal distribution (stage 1) to a Pareto-superior distribution such 
that group A and B are both better-off than in the initial distribution but that B has 
eight times the amount of social primary goods than A. The Pareto argument, to be 
clear, concludes that we ought to prefer ‘the most egalitarian of all the Pareto-optimal 
arrangements satisfying the requirement that everyone should gain from inequality’ 
                                                 
6 See (Rawls 1971, 73-4) and also (Rawls 1993, 281). 
7 More specifically, Rawls and Barry argue for ‘democratic equality,’ see (Rawls 1971, §§12-13) and 
(Barry 1989, §27). This first component of the argument is not controversial and so a lengthy discussion 
of it is inappropriate.  
4 
 
(Barry 1989, 227).8 The argument identifies a particular unequal state of affairs or dis-
tribution, and for Rawls, this result is exactly what the difference principle picks out. 
Furthermore, this is why Barry thinks that the Pareto argument is another way to ar-
gue for Rawls’ difference principle. 
The Pareto argument can now be stated as follows: 
[Stage 1] 
(P1) If talents, endowments, interests, etc, at the outset are ‘morally arbitrary,’ 
then the initial distribution should be equal. 
(P2) Talents, endowments, interests, etc, at the outset are ‘morally arbitrary. 
(C) Thus, the initial distribution should be equal. 
[Stage 2] 
(P1) There is an unequal Pareto-optimal distribution that i) is strongly Pareto-
superior to the initial equal distribution, and ii) is the most equal of the Pareto-
optimal distributions. 
                                                 
8 A major source of confusion, we believe, stems from conflating the Pareto argument with similar ar-
guments that also implement Pareto principles. Below are two similar arguments that conclude that ine-
quality is justified: 
 (P1) Either the distribution of primary social goods is equal or unequal. 
(P2) The best feasible equal distribution is Pareto-inferior to some unequal distribution. 
(C) Thus, an unequal distribution of primary social goods is always to be preferred (Cohen 
1995, 163). 
Obviously, this argument for inequality is not the Pareto argument because (P1) would be rejected 
by the first stage of the Pareto argument. The Pareto argument does not regard the relationship between 
equality and inequality as open-ended in this way. The Pareto argument insists on the initial distribution 
of goods being equal such that in at least one instance (but perhaps many more) an equal distribution is 
justified. But, (P1) is compatible with an initial distribution being unequal.  
The second of the two arguments takes the first stage of the Pareto argument into account: 
(P1*) Equal distribution of primary social goods is the prima facie just baseline. 
(P2) The best feasible equal distribution is Pareto-inferior to some unequal distribution. 
(C) Thus, an unequal distribution of primary social goods ought to be preferred. 
Now, whilst this second argument is compatible with the first stage of the Pareto argument, it is 
non-specific with the kind of Pareto-optimal distribution that is to be preferred. This second argument is 
compatible with any Pareto-improvement from the initial equal distribution, even distributions that ex-
emplify a tremendously large gap of equality between the better-off and worst-off. By contrast, the 
Pareto argument does not permit any Pareto-improvement from the initial equal distribution but rather 
permits one unique outcome, namely, the most equal of the Pareto-optimal distributions. Cf. (Rawls 
1971, 69).  
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(P2) If there is an unequal Pareto-optimal distribution that i) is strongly Pareto-
superior to the initial equal distribution, and ii) is the most equal of the Pareto-
optimal distributions, then this unequal distribution ought to be preferred over 
the initial equal distribution. 
(C) Thus, this unequal Pareto-optimal distribution ought to be preferred over 
the initial equal distribution.  
There is one objection of Barry’s reconstruction of Rawls that is worth dispelling 
here. One of Shaw’s criticisms is to argue that it is unlikely that Rawls used the Pareto 
argument at all. Shaw presents the Pareto argument by quoting the following passage 
from A Theory of Justice: 
Imagine, then, a hypothetical initial arrangement in which all the social primary 
goods are equally distributed: everyone has similar rights and duties, and in-
come and wealth are evenly shared. This state of affairs provides a benchmark 
for judging improvements. If certain inequalities of wealth and organizational 
powers would make everyone better off than in this hypothetical starting situa-
tion, then they accord with the general conception (Rawls 1971, 62).9 
Shaw thinks this is the Pareto argument ‘in a nutshell’ and that the argument con-
cludes that ‘a position of inequality is justifiable so long as everyone benefits from it’ 
(Shaw 1999, 354). From this, Shaw argues that ‘it is doubtful whether Rawls does in 
fact employ the Pareto argument for inequality’ (Shaw 1999, 353). Rawls’ adoption of 
the difference principle rules out Pareto-improvements that exemplify a tremendous 
gap between the worse-off and better-off, and so Rawls would not accept every 
Pareto-improvement that is Pareto-superior to the initial equal distribution. However, 
according to Shaw, this would-be rejection by Rawls shows that Rawls does not em-
ploy the Pareto argument as friends of the Pareto argument accept that every Pareto-
improvement is an improvement that is a ‘change for the better’.   
But this claim is misguided by the fact that Shaw fails to identify the Pareto argu-
ment that Barry reconstructed from Rawls. At the end of §11 from which the above 
passage was taken Rawls goes on to say that, 
[i]t is obvious, however, that there are indefinitely many ways in which all may 
be advantaged when the initial arrangement of equality is taken as a bench-
mark. How then are we to choose among these possibilities? The principles 
must be specified so that they yield a determinate conclusion (Rawls 1971, 65, 
our italics). 
                                                 
9 NB: Rawls is referring to the general conception of justice which states that all ‘social values—liberty 
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless 
an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage’ (Rawls 1971, 62). This 
is to be contrasted with the special conception of justice which has a lexical (serial) ordering such that 
certain basic liberties cannot be exchanged for economic and social gains.  
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Rawls then goes on to consider what that determinate conclusion is in the next two 
sections. Rawls sets up the issue as determining which Pareto-optimal outcome is the 
just outcome as follows, 
‘The problem is to choose between them, to find a conception of justice that 
singles out one of these efficient distributions as also just. If we succeed in this, 
we shall have gone beyond mere efficiency yet in a way compatible with it’ 
(Rawls 1971, 71). 
The determinate conclusion, according to Barry’s interpretation, is the most equal 
of the Pareto-optimal outcomes and it is only this outcome and the particular depar-
ture from the initial equality to this outcome that is justified. This is the determinate 
conclusion of the Pareto argument. Shaw’s claim that Rawls did not employ the Pareto 
argument is simply incorrect insofar as Shaw has misidentified the structure of the 
Pareto argument.10 
   
§2: The Justification of the Pareto principles  
Shaw’s overall objection against the Pareto argument says that the Pareto argument 
fails to get off the ground because it depends on taking ‘as self-evident that Pareto 
changes are changes for the better,’ but that, according to Shaw’s objection, the claim 
that Pareto changes are self-evident is unjustified. So, the grounds on which the Pareto 
argument depends is undermined. However, as we will argue in this section, the prem-
ise that the Pareto argument depends on the intuitive proposal that the Pareto condi-
tions are self-evident is false. The Pareto argument need not appeal to self-evidence or 
intuition in determining what changes are Pareto changes nor in grounding the Pareto 
principles proper. The appeal to self-evidence fails and rightly so, but it does not fol-
low that the Pareto principles are left unjustified and that the Pareto argument fails to 
get off the ground. In fact the Pareto conditions are grounded in rational self-interest 
and so ought to be interpreted as conditions of individual rationality, or in other 
words, the Pareto conditions ought to be included among the basic set of principles of 
individual rationality which are concerned with individual preference and maximisa-
tion of expected utility. We will argue for this proposal in this section. 
                                                 
10 One could object here and say that this is merely a terminological issue between us and Shaw. He has 
in mind one kind of argument that uses the weak-Pareto-principle (he calls it WPP for short) to justify 
any or several unequal outcomes, and we are thinking of a more fine-grained argument that attempts to 
justify a specific (the most equal of the Pareto-optimal) unequal outcome. This objection, we say, is in-
correct. This is not a terminological issue insofar as Shaw takes himself to be responding to Barry’s re-
construction of Rawls’ argument in chapter 2 of A Theory of Justice and Cohen’s critique of Barry. If 
anything Shaw is simply dialectically confused and his discussion of the Pareto argument severely suffers 
from this confusion. If Shaw thinks he is discussing the same argument as Cohen, then Cohen is also 
attacking a straw-man, and so much the worse for both of them. We think that Cohen can be inter-
preted as correctly representing Barry’s reconstruction of Rawls although Cohen does not explicitly 
mention that a unique Pareto-optimal outcome is the determinate conclusion of the Pareto argument. 
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The Pareto principles,11 (sometimes called definitions or conditions) are the core 
components of the Pareto argument which are used to derive the conclusion that a par-
ticular unequal distribution or outcome is justified.12 The core principles (from note 
11) viz., (weak)Pareto-principle and (strong)Pareto-principle, in plain English are as 
follows. If a change benefits everyone, then it is a change for the better, and if a change 
benefits some but harms no one, then it is a change for the better. Counterfactually, 
were a shift to a feasible Pareto-improvement in which everyone or some gain (but 
none are worst-off) not made, then it would be a bad outcome or a change for the 
worse.13 
But, how exactly are the Pareto principles justified? One way to ground the Pareto 
principles is to appeal to their obviousness or the fact that they seem to be self-evident. 
For example, when considering a shift from one overall state of affairs to another such 
that one person benefits and no one else is made worse-off it seems intuitively compel-
ling to say that it is a shift worth accepting or at least a shift that does not on the face 
of it seem objectionable. That the Pareto conditions seem intuitively compelling is 
made more salient when considering state of affairs in which everyone gains from 
shifting from one state of affairs to another. Why would anyone object to such a shift 
insofar as it is ceteris paribus a ‘change for the better’? Such considerations can be 
thought of as instances of the more general claim that if someone can benefit from 
something without harming anyone else, then we ought to let such a state of affairs be 
realised. The self-evidence of which stares us in the face. Call this the intuitive pro-
posal.  
                                                 
11 Curiously named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923).  
12 More formally, (strong)Pareto-superiority: if everyone is better off in S1 rather than S2, then S1 is 
strongly-Pareto-superior to S2. (weak)Pareto-superiority: if at least one person is better off and no one is 
worse off in S1 rather than S2, then S1 is weakly-Pareto-superior to S2. The contrary of Pareto-
superiority being: Pareto-inferiority: if S1 is Pareto-superior to S2, then S2 is Pareto-inferior to S1. Fur-
ther, if some state of affairs is Pareto-superior to S1, then S1 is Pareto-inferior (tout court). Next, we can 
characterise a specific Pareto-superior state of affairs that yields an optimal distribution also in two cor-
responding ways: (strong)Pareto-optimality: if no state of affairs is weakly-Pareto-superior to S1, then 
S1 is strongly-Pareto-optimal. (weak)Pareto-optimality: if no state of affairs is strongly-Pareto-superior 
to S1, then S1 is weakly-Pareto-optimal. In addition, the conditions under which certain states of affairs 
can be compared are as follows: Pareto-comparability & -incomparability: if either S1 or S2 are Pareto-
superior to the other, then S1 and S2 are Pareto-comparable. However, if neither S1 nor S2 are Pareto-
superior to the other, then S1 and S2 are Pareto-incomparable. If any two states of affairs are Pareto-
comparable, then the relation between the two states of affairs can be characterised as: (strong)Pareto-
improvement: if C1 benefits everyone, then C1 is a strong-Pareto-improvement. (weak)Pareto-
improvement: if C1 benefits at least one person and no one is made worse-off, then C1 is a weak-
Pareto-improvement. (strong)Pareto-principle: if C1 is a feasible weak-Pareto-improvement, then the 
strong-Pareto-principle mandates C1. (weak)Pareto-principle: if C1 is a feasible strong-Pareto-
improvement, then the weak-Pareto-principle mandates C1. 
13 We are concerned with states of affairs in which everyone gains and so are concerned with 
(weak)Pareto-optimality. However, we think it is a shame that the ways of stating Pareto-optimality are 
usually characterised as weak and strong. It is misleading to call weak-Pareto-optimality weak since it 
requires the stringent condition that everyone gains. Some, we think, call it weak due to its obviousness, 
but as will be argued later we reject grounding the Pareto principles on intuition or self-evidence. A bet-
ter label would be strict-Pareto-optimality, see (McClennen ms, Chapter 3: Rational Cooperation) and 
McClennen (forthcoming). 
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The intuitive proposal is put forth by several defenders of the Pareto principles, for 
example, economists, such as, Yew Kwang Ng and James Griffin. Griffin writes,  
there are standards for the good of many persons that are as obvious and inevi-
table as the standard for one person. There is this one for instance: if some in a 
group become better off and none become worse off, the state of the group is 
better. It is hard to see how anyone could resist such a principle (Griffin 1986, 
147, original italics??).  
The Pareto principles, according to this proposal, are justified by the fact that they 
are self-evident, intuitively compelling and downright obvious to the extent that to re-
ject them requires a counter-intuitive claim not worth accepting without independent 
motivation and further argument. Kwang Ng goes so far as to say that to reject the 
Pareto conditions ‘takes a rather peculiar ethic’ (1980, 31). However, there are three 
objections against this kind of justification which we think provide at least prima facie 
reasons for rejecting the intuitive proposal.14  
First, one can press hard on the claim to self-evidence by appealing to cases where 
it is morally questionable which harms we should take into account when determining 
whether a shift from one state of affairs to another is after all a Pareto shift. For in-
stance, if we shift from one state of affairs to another in which the rich receive an in-
crease in wealth and the worse-off remain at the same level of income, the Pareto con-
ditions licence such an improvement. However, the very fact that there is an inequality 
of this nature in the state of affairs to which we shifted might reduce the well-being of 
the worse-off.15 If there is such a negative effect in this shift, then friends of the Pareto 
conditions might claim that after all this is a shift worth accepting since the worse-off 
were not made even worse off. However, if we respond in this manner, we are taking a 
stand on what is to be counted as ‘morally significant’ when accounting for the well-
being of everyone in the shift from one state of affairs to another (Shaw 1999, 361). 
Thus, determining whether a shift is a Pareto shift involves complicated moral issues 
that leave the justification of Pareto conditions far from being self-evident in the sense 
that it is unquestionably obvious. Put briefly, the fact that the Pareto principles assume 
a ‘metric’ by which to determine when some group or person is better off is not uncon-
troversial so as to secure the claim that the Pareto principles are simply self-evident or 
downright obvious.16  
                                                 
14 We are largely in agreement with Shaw regarding the status of the intuitive proposal. As will be ar-
gued below however we do not think that friends of the Pareto conditions need to appeal to self-
evidence to justify the Pareto conditions.   
15 George Smith argues that material inequality reduces the well-being of the worse-off so that relative 
poverty in addition to absolute poverty needs to be taken into account. See (Smith 1996), from (Shaw 
1999, 360). 
16 One could response to the first objection by arguing that the claim to self-evidence is not undermined 
as such and that the first objection only shows that there are some cases where the Pareto conditions are 
overridden by other considerations. It would only be a matter of refining the application of the Pareto 
conditions by introducing a ceteris paribus clause to get another this objection. We think that this re-
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Second, a problem can be posed against the Pareto conditions directly by showing 
that there are cases in which the Pareto principles are counter-intuitive or provide us 
with a counter-intuitive result. Shaw presents the following example that involves the 
supposed violation of one’s rights: 
Unknown to Angela, her unscrupulous uncle has died and she stands to inherit 
enormous wealth. Knowing that Angela would immediately destroy the bequest 
because she disapproves of the life her uncle led, and knowing also that there is 
no risk that his actions will come to light, Angela’s lawyer surreptitiously di-
verts the whole bequest to a cause from which everyone benefits (1999, 362).   
Given that everyone benefits from the lawyer’s actions, we have a Pareto improve-
ment from one state of affairs to another. But it seems as though the lawyer violated 
the rights of Angela by disposing of her inheritance despite the fact that it benefited 
everyone. In response to this example the defender of the Pareto principles can bite the 
bullet and say that the shift that resulted from the lawyer’s actions was after all a 
Pareto shift, one that is mandated by the Pareto principles. However, this response 
ends up being a contentious claim that very few will accept and opponents thereof will 
not accept. Thus, the Pareto principles do not seem to be self-evident or as obvious as 
some make them out to be. 
The third objection is a general objection regarding claims to self-evidence concern-
ing the justification of normative propositions. The general lesson being that the very 
appeal to self-evidence itself is epistemically insecure since people’s intuitions clash on 
such matters and in many different places. Any purported justification based on self-
evidence or intuition of normative principles which include the Pareto principles is ul-
timately doomed. In light of this, we advocate the justification of normative principles 
in instrumental terms that focuses on what people ought to do rather than what they 
ought to believe.17 This way the Pareto principles are justified by appealing to rational 
self-interest and general principles of individual rationality. Such a justification we say 
is epistemically secure in that it is grounded in such means-ends reasoning governing 
what one ought to do given what one ought to prefer.  
We say that the Pareto principles are grounded in rational self-interest and so the 
Pareto principles ought to be understood as principles of individual rationality. Haus-
man and McPherson put the proposal nicely, 
A Pareto optimum (also called a “Pareto efficient” allocation) is typically de-
fined as a state of affairs in which it is impossible to make anyone better-off 
without making someone worse-off, but this purported definition is misleading. 
                                                                                                                                                        
sponse only weakens the strength of the Pareto conditions and raises new questions about the content of 
such ceteris paribus clauses which may also in the end be controversial. The point of this first objection 
would still stand. The Pareto conditions are not unquestionably obvious to award them the status of 
being self-evident nor can one ground them in such a claim. Thanks to ___[BLINDED]___. 
17 See (McClennen 2010; ms, Introduction) for discussion. 
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It is more accurate to say that R is a “Pareto improvement” over S if nobody 
prefers S to R and somebody prefers R to S; then R is a Pareto optimum if and 
only if there are no Pareto improvements over R (Hausman & McPherson 
2006, 65). 
The point to take well is that it is misleading to characterise the Pareto conditions 
wholly in terms of global states of affairs that are related in various ways, instead it is 
clearer to characterise them in terms of the preferences of individuals. If the Pareto 
principles are understood as conditions of individual rationality, then we can directly 
state the conditions in terms of the agent’s individual preferences. Call this the individ-
ual proposal. 
In axiomatic models of bargaining used in economic theory, 
[Pareto-optimality] can be thought of requiring that the players collectively 
should behave in a rational way, since it specifies that the solution will select an 
outcome such that no other feasible outcome is preferred by all the players. The 
outcome must be a maximal element of the “social preference” defined by the 
intersection of all the individual preferences (Roth 1979, 11 [pdf]).18 
Collective rationality seems to amount to the convergence of the individual prefer-
ences of every rational agent that is involved in the bargaining problem. John Nash 
himself claims that the assumption of Pareto-optimality ‘expresses the idea that each 
individual wishes to maximize the utility to himself of the ultimate bargain’ (Nash 
1950, 159).19 
The relevant Pareto conditions are listed below with our revised interpretation in 
light of the individual proposal (see also note x): 
(strong)Pareto-improvement*: S1 is a strong-Pareto-improvement over S2 if 1) 
S1 is strongly-Pareto-superior to S2, and 2) everyone prefers S1 to S2. 
(weak)Pareto-optimality*: S1 is weakly-Pareto-optimal iff there are no strong-
Pareto-improvements over S1. 
(weak)Pareto-principle*: if C1 is weakly-Pareto-optimal* and a strong-Pareto-
improvement*, then the weak-Pareto-principle* mandates C1. 
If everyone benefits from a shift to S1 which is strongly-Pareto-superior to S2, then 
everyone ought to prefer S1 to S2. For agent A to not prefer S1 to S2 would result in a 
                                                 
18 Roth says elsewhere, ‘… since it specifies that the solution will select an outcome having the property 
that no other feasible outcome is preferred by all of the players’ (1980, 308). 
19 See (Diskin & Felsenthal 2007) for a more recent axiomatic model. They modify Roth’s axiom of 
Individual Rationality so as to include the condition that ‘a player should not be considered ‘individu-
ally rational’ if he accepts an agreement that provides him with a utility lower than the minimal utility 
he can derive in case the parties reach a Pareto optimal agreement’ (Diskin & Felsenthal 2007, 26). This 
in effect reincorporates the axiom of Pareto-optimality into the axiom of Individual Rationality. 
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violation of maximisation of expected utility. If everyone is better off in S1 rather than 
S2, then everyone ought to prefer S1 to S2. Further, if S1 is strongly-Pareto-superior to 
S2, then everyone ought to prefer S1 to S2. Ultimately we argue that in the case of jus-
tice there is one unique Pareto-optimal outcome that is to be preferred by all in the 
form of a unanimous agreement determined by a bargaining process between all ra-
tional agents cooperatively engaging in the distribution of primary social goods. Before 
we can fully develop this idea we need to defend the Pareto argument from Cohen’s 
critique. 
 
§3: Cohen’s Critique of the Pareto Argument  
Cohen argues that there is an inconsistency between the first and second stage of the 
Pareto argument. He claims that if one accepts ‘equality of opportunity’ and regards it 
as prima facie just, then one cannot accept ‘the particular type of Pareto-improvement 
favoured by Rawls’ (Cohen 1995, 162).20 There is an inconsistency here because it is 
always possible for there to be a ‘Pareto-optimal equal distribution that is also Pareto-
superior to the initial equality’ (1995, 162). If one has already accepted the initial 
equality, Cohen argues, one must prefer this Pareto-superior equal distribution over 
the Pareto-superior distribution of inequality suggested by Rawls’ difference principle. 
To do otherwise would undermine the reasons for accepting the initial equality of the 
first stage of the argument. In other words, accepting the second stage of the Pareto 
argument is inconsistent with accepting the first.  
Cohen has a more particular objection to the Pareto argument that rejects, what 
we will call, following Cohen, the Rawlsian irrationality thesis, which says that it is 
irrational prefer the initial equality in light of a particular unequal Pareto-optimal out-
come.21 Again, following Cohen, we call the initial equal distribution of social primary 
goods ‘D1’ and the particular unequal Pareto-superior distribution under considera-
tion ‘D2’. We will further stipulate that there are two groups of people in these and 
further states of affairs below known as the untalented ‘A’ and the talented ‘B’. In D1, 
A and B have an equal number of primary social goods, however, in D2, the distribu-
tion of primary social goods is such that B (let’s say) has a greater quantity than A. 
Cohen invites us to consider the following logically possible state of affairs ‘D3’. D3 is 
strongly-Pareto-superior to D1 but A and B have an equal distribution of primary so-
cial goods. Cohen writes, ‘… D3 preserves equality, and the untalented are better off 
in D3 than they are in D2, while the talented are less well off in D3 than in D2, and 
                                                 
20 This article is incorporated into Chapter 4 of Cohen’s Rescuing Justice and Equality. We refer 
throughout to the original (1995) article.  
21 Rawls summarises much later that, ‘… an equal division of all primary goods is irrational in view of 
the possibility of bettering everyone’s circumstances by accepting certain inequalities’ (Rawls 1971, 
546). 
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both are better off in D3 than they are in D1’ (1995, 171). We represent this as fol-
lows: 
 
Cohen argues that if D3 is feasible (i.e., I2 is available) and B is willing to enjoy a 
lower wage rate that what they would enjoy in D2, then ‘Rawls’ claim about the irra-
tionality of insisting on equality in the face of the possibility of a Pareto-superior ine-
quality would lose its force, since a Pareto-improving equality-preserving move, in 
which no one is as badly off as some are in D2, would now also be available’ (1995, 
172, original italics). This more particular objection lends weight to the general objec-
tion that the Pareto argument is inconsistent as it attempts to show that there is no 
reason to say that it is irrational to prefer a shift from the initial equal distribution to a 
Pareto-superior distribution that is also equal. Call the more particular objection the 
irrationality objection, and the more general objection the inconsistency objection.22 In 
this section, we argue that both objections do not succeed. 
The inconsistency objection originates from a more general worry about how 
Rawls can say in the same breadth that an initial equality is just but that an inequality 
is justified even if everyone benefits. Cohen is not the first to pick up on this tension.23 
                                                 
22 There is the question whether the more general objection, according to Cohen, depends on the more 
particular objection so that to argue against the more general we need only attack the more particular. 
However, as we will see, the more general objection has been raised by earlier commentators of Rawls 
which leads us to regard it as independent and worthy of separate discussion from the particular objec-
tion. We hope that our discussion of the more general objection then singles out and isolates the more 
particular objection which we then argue is also mistaken. 
23 See (Grey 1973) and (Narveson 1976, 1978).  
A B 
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Although Cohen fails to mention this, Barry does anticipate his inconsistency objection 
explicitly and discusses it at length.24 The general objection, according to Barry, is that 
if we accept the initial equality as prima facie just, then any incentives become redun-
dant as everyone would simply agree that it is just to enjoy the same wage rate. B 
agrees to enjoy a lower wage rate in D3 than in D2, because it is just to enjoy the same 
wage rate as A. So the purported shift from the initial equality to any Pareto-superior 
inequality is exacerbated since the reasons for regarding D1 as just are the same rea-
sons for regarding D3 as just. Thus, we can only shift from the initial equal distribu-
tion to an equal Pareto-superior distribution. Ultimately justice demands of us an 
equal distribution. 
The problem for Rawls then is how people who are committed to justice can have 
self-interested motivations for personal gain. If we claim that people need material in-
centives to produce according to their optimal capacity, then they are less concerned 
with the considerations and circumstances of justice and more fixated on personal 
gain. Barry first considers a response to this problem which demotes the difference 
principle to the level of being a second-rate principle or a principle of relative justice.25 
However this is not something Rawls would accept. He thinks that the difference prin-
ciple is a principle of ideal justice and that ultimately a particular form of inequality is 
justified and ought to be preferred by all.  
In order to explain the move from initial equality to Pareto-superior inequality and 
retain Rawls’ claim that the difference principle is ideally just Barry argues that “free-
dom of occupational choice” is best understood as a “basic liberty” that is then sub-
sumed under the first principle of justice and subsequently given priority over the dif-
ference principle. If Rawls is entitled to this move in light of his egalitarian premises, 
which Barry thinks he is, then the alleged inconsistency between the first stage and 
second stage of the Pareto argument is explained away. Barry concludes, 
‘I can therefore see no problem of internal coherence for Rawls’ theory if we 
understand the application of the difference principle to be limited by the con-
straint of respecting freedom of occupational choice’ (1989, 400).26  
This qualification would also rule out Cohen’s claim, which is at work in the irra-
tionality objection, that B is willing to enjoy the same wage rates as A in D3 when B is 
                                                 
24 See (Barry 1989, 396); cf. (Barry 1989, 234). 
25 If we accepted such, Barry writes, [i]t would then enable us to explain quite easily how we get from 
the premise that all inequalities based on differential productive ability are morally arbitrary to a con-
clusion in which there are inequalities corresponding to productive contributions. We would simply say 
that these inequalities are not ideally just, but that, once we concede the need for incentives, inequalities 
permitted by the difference principle are the only defensible ones (Barry 1989, 398, our italics). 
26 Rawls himself remarks, ‘Thus justice is defined so that it is consistent with efficiency, at least when 
the two principles are perfectly fulfilled. Of course, if the basic structure is unjust, these principles will 
authorize changes that may lower the expectations of some of those better off; and therefore the democ-
ratic conception is not consistent with the principle of efficiency if this principle is taken to mean that 
only changes which improve everyone’s prospects are allowed’ (Rawls 1971, 79). 
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working more hours than A. Since considerations of justice do not demand that B ac-
cept or be willing to accept the same (and hence lower) wage rate as A, such a con-
straint can only be established by ‘some combination of coercion and moral suasion’ 
(Barry 1989, 400). But Rawls and the proponent of the Pareto argument need not ac-
cept this kind of coercion or moral suasion. More importantly, we ought to remind 
ourselves that the conclusion of the Pareto argument coincides with the outcome that 
the difference principle picks out. So when parties are bargaining in a particular coop-
erative setting, namely, the bargaining problem of justice, they have already secured 
certain sets of rights prudentially.27  
Recall that the irrationality objection says that the irrationality of preferring an 
equal distribution to an unequal distribution is undermined when one considers the 
possibility of D3—an equal distribution that is Pareto-superior to D1. In short, Cohen 
is arguing that in light of I2 (i.e., the shift from D1 to D3) it is not irrational to prefer 
an equal distribution over an unequal distribution. However, the general claim that it 
is not irrational to prefer any equal distribution over an unequal one is false. By 
Cohen’s lights, B is worse off in D3 than in D2 despite the fact that Cohen makes it 
the case that B is willing to enjoy the same wage rate as A. If D3 is feasible, then there 
is a Pareto-superior unequal distribution, call it D4, in which B is better off and A is 
not made worse off. This in effect renders D3 as a sub-optimal state of affairs even 
though it is Pareto-superior to D1. The shift from D3 to D4 tells us that it is irrational 
to prefer an equal distribution over an unequal one. B would prefer D4 to D3 and A 
would be indifferent between the two and thus weakly prefers D4 to D3.28 Thus, 
Cohen has failed to undermine the Rawlsian irrationality thesis. 
 
§4: Conclusion 
Although we have shown that Shaw is discussing a straw-man and not the Pareto ar-
gument per se, he does have a well-taken criticism of Cohen that is worth mentioning. 
To be clear, Rawlsian exegesis is our least concern, and we will suppose for the pur-
poses of explicating Shaw’s objection that the conclusion endorsed by the Pareto ar-
gument is that any unequal Pareto-superior distribution is justified. We will then dis-
cuss Shaw’s second response to Cohen that helps illuminate his misinterpretation of 
the Pareto argument. 
                                                 
27 See (McClennen ms, chapter on Prudence and Rights). 
28 Cohen mentions the response that if we have D3 then why don’t we start with D3. He asks, ‘Why was 
the original equality not pitched at D3, instead of at D1, when D3 is Pareto-superior to D1?’ (1995, 
174). But then says nothing else about this response other than saying that ‘[h]ad we begun with D3, D2 
would have been seen for what it is’. This is a red herring however. If we had started with D3, then the 
unequal Pareto-superior distribution in which a strong Pareto-improvement is available would not be 
D2 but rather some other Pareto-superior distribution. 
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Shaw attempts to show that Cohen’s purported solution to the tension between the 
two stages of the Pareto argument ‘ultimately sidesteps the problem’. According to 
Shaw, Cohen attributes to Rawls two ‘value judgements’ which conflict: ‘that depar-
tures from equality are unacceptable, and that changes from which everyone benefits 
are for the better’ (Shaw 1999, 358). Cohen then argues that the equality-preserving 
Pareto-superior state of affairs D3 does not offend either of these ‘value judgements’. 
But, Shaw asks, how is Cohen to evaluate I1 (i.e., the shift from D1 to D2) when D3 is 
feasible, or better, when I2 (i.e., the shift from D1 to D3) is available? If we follow the 
weak Pareto principle, I1 is to be regarded as a ‘change for the better,’ however by es-
tablishing that justice ultimately requires an equal distribution, we are forced to say 
that I1 is a ‘change for the worse’. But this contradicts the spirit of the weak Pareto 
principle which claims that any unequal Pareto-superior distribution is a ‘change for 
the better’. Thus, the fact that Cohen points out that D3 is feasible does not eliminate 
the alleged tension between the two stages of the argument.  
Insofar as this is an objection against Cohen’s positive claim we adopt the point as 
our own. Cohen does not eliminate the tension between the two stages of the argu-
ment by simply pointing out the feasibility of D3 or the availability of I2. However, as 
we mentioned earlier, Shaw’s exposition of the argument is strictly speaking mistaken. 
Whilst it is true that the weak Pareto principle says that ‘a change for the better’ re-
sults from any unequal Pareto-superior distribution to the initial equality, Rawls and 
Barry do not implement the Pareto principles in this way. They understand, of course, 
that there are many unequal distributions that are morally repugnant and ought not to 
be considered when addressing the circumstances of justice.    
To explain how Shaw has misunderstood the Pareto argument we will discuss the 
other worry he has with Cohen’s solution which he thinks involves ‘a strange conse-
quence’. For Cohen, if D3 is possible, then D2 is unacceptable. However, D1 is also 
unacceptable as well. D1 is unacceptable just because it is Pareto-inferior to D2 and 
D3. Shaw concludes, 
‘And thus Cohen’s solution would commit Rawls to holding that every position 
is unacceptable except for the most equal feasible Pareto-optimal position’ 
(Shaw 1999, 358, original italics).29 
But this is exactly the conclusion that the Pareto argument demands. Recall that 
the current dispute dialectically speaking right now is about the Pareto argument and 
not Rawlsian exegesis; and as Barry explicitly argues this is the determinate conclu-
sion. For example, 
                                                 
29 One of Shaw’s immediate reactions to this so called ‘strange consequence’ is that it is ‘so high a stan-
dard of acceptability’ (Shaw 1999, 358). But why, under circumstances of justice, should one think that 
a high standard is unwarranted? If anything we ought to retain such a high standard given what is at 
stake. 
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‘It may be recalled that the difference principle was to satisfy the criterion that 
“everyone must gain” from an inequality in some sense beyond that of creating 
a Pareto improvement on equality’ (Barry 1989, 233, our italics). 
And again, 
‘The difference principle picks out the most egalitarian of all the Pareto-optimal 
arrangements satisfying the requirement that everyone should gain from ine-
quality’ (Barry 1989, 227).30  
Shaw’s ‘strange consequence’ can be interpreted as an objection against the Pareto 
argument even though he has failed to properly identify it. Shaw argues that it is a 
strange consequence because ‘… even if better situations than D1 are feasible, that 
would not normally be felt to rule out D1’s being an acceptable, or a good, situation’ 
(Shaw 1999, 358). But this is to miss the whole point of the Pareto argument and the 
fact that it proceeds in stages. Rawls also says that ‘[j]ustice is prior to efficiency and 
requires some changes that are not efficient in this sense’ (Rawls 1971, 79-80). We 
first secure an initial equal distribution as prima facie just, and secure this on inde-
pendent grounds stemming from the fact that endowments, talents, etc are morally ar-
bitrary. Once we have secured this, then parties bargain to determine a Pareto-superior 
distribution to the initial distribution they have already secured and can fall back on if 
one of the agents does not prefer a proposed distribution. This bargaining process, 
which is the essence of the Pareto argument, proceeds across time. The initial equal 
distribution, whilst sub-optimal if other states of affairs are Pareto-optimal, is the 
‘point of no agreement,’ and Individual rationality as an axiom in standard and non-
standard bargaining models guarantees that agents can terminate any agreement and 
walk away with what they started with, and in the case of justice they can walk away 
with the initial equal distribution. However, as the argument goes, it is irrational to do 
so as the inequality that can be realised if everyone cooperates ensures that everyone is 
better off.  
Moreover, it is misleading to say that every position is unacceptable ‘except for the 
most equal feasible Pareto-optimal position’ as many states of affairs will be Pareto-
incomparable and thus such a judgement is not possible. It is more accurate to say that 
every improvement is unacceptable except for the improvement that shifts everyone to 
the most equal feasible Pareto-optimal distribution. The most equal outcome respects 
the justification of the first stage because it is concerned with the gap of inequality be-
tween the worst-off and better-off, and is concerned with how differing groups receive 
their gains. The most equal outcome is just if the gains had by the better-off do not 
come at the expense of the worst-off. The outcome is a cooperative one, and the bar-
gaining between, say, A and B is one of cooperation, where all parties gain but not at 
                                                 
30 Just to thrash this point, Barry announces his aims at the outset of chapter 6: ‘I shall try to show that 
the difference principle does, as Rawls maintains, pick out a unique Pareto-optimal point that is a 
Pareto improvement on an equal distribution’ (Barry 1989, 214). 
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the expense of anyone else. We reiterate that the Pareto argument focuses on coopera-
tive outcomes where the distribution of social primary goods comes about when the 
parties or groups involved interact cooperatively. In these cooperative outcomes, the 
gains to the differing parties or groups are not realised at the cost of any other party or 
group. To be clear, ‘everyone gains’ really means ‘everyone gains and no one loses’. 
This follows from the outcome being a cooperative one.   
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